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I characterize the optimal export promoting policy for internationalmarketswhose structure is endogenous.Contrary
to the ambiguous results of strategic trade policy for duopolies, it is always optimal to subsidize exports when entry is
endogenous, under bothquantity andprice competition.Withhomogenous goods theoptimal export subsidy is a fraction
1/ of the price, where  is the elasticity of demand (the exact opposite of the optimal export tax in the neoclassical trade
theory). Analogously, I show the general optimality of R&D subsidies and of competitive devaluations to promote
exports in foreign markets where entry is endogenous.
1. INTRODUCTION
A wide literature on optimal strategic trade policy and on other forms of strategic export
promotion has been developed since the pathbreaking contributions of Brander and Spencer
(1985), Eaton and Grossman (1986), and others. A disappointing result of this literature has
been that its policy prescriptions on whether and how we should subsidize or tax exports have
been largely ambiguous and dependent on the particular assumptions on the market structures
under consideration, in particular whether competition is in quantities or prices (see Helpman
and Krugman, 1989).2 This article argues that, independently from the assumptions on the
market structures adopted in this literature, any ambiguity on the optimal unilateral export
promoting policy vanishes under a single and (possibly) realistic condition. This condition is
that entry of firms in the international competition is endogenous (i.e., determined by profit
maximizing decisions of the firms). Under this condition, contrary to the traditional results, it
is always optimal to subsidize exports under both competition in quantities and in prices. One
can apply the same principle to general models of trade policy, R&D policy, and exchange rate
policy.
Commonwisdomon the benefits of export subsidization largely departs from the implications
of trade theory. Although export promotion is often supported by governments, theory is hardly
in favor of its direct or indirect implementation. In the standard neoclassical framework with
perfect competition, the scope of trade policy is to improve the terms of trade, that is, the
price of exports relative to the price of imports, and, as long as a country is large enough to
affect the terms of trade, it is optimal to tax exports (because this is equivalent to set a tariff
on imports); more precisely, the optimal unilateral export tax can be derived as a fraction
1/ of the price, where  is the elasticity of demand (Lerner, 1934, 1936; Kaldor, 1940). The
same outcome emerges under monopolistic competition, as shown by Helpman and Krugman
(1989). In case of strategic interactions between few firms, however, a second aim of strategic
trade policy is to shift profits toward the domestic firms; therefore a large body of recent
literature has studied models with a fixed number of firms competing in a third market with
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positive profits. Here, the optimal unilateral policy is an export tax under price competition
or whenever strategic complementarity holds (Eaton and Grossman, 1986). Under quantity
competition, an export subsidy can be optimal (Brander and Spencer, 1985), but only under
certain conditions.3 According to a leading trade economist (Bhagwati, 1988), the ambiguity
of these results “creates information requirements for policy intervention that appear to many
of the architects of this theoretical innovation to be sufficiently intimidating to suggest that
policymakers had better leave it alone.” 4
Nevertheless, different forms of direct or indirect export subsidies are widespread. Gov-
ernments strongly support exporting firms (especially in time of crisis), they often hide forms
of export promotion behind nationalistic pride, and they consider the conquer of larger mar-
ket shares abroad as a positive achievement in itself. The European Union coordinates trade
between its members and the rest of the world in a similar spirit and subsidizes exports of
agricultural products and the aircraft industry. France has often supported its “national cham-
pions” with public subsidies. Italy has a long tradition of public support of the Made in Italy,
which is quite important for the promotion of fashion, design, and food industries. Japan has
adopted a policy of targeted export promotion through its Ministry of Economy, Industry, and
Trade. Korea and other East Asian countries have implemented export promoting policies for
decades. Heavily protected South American countries have tried to subsidize manufactured
products in which they could develop a comparative advantage (and not only those). Even the
United States has implemented strong forms of export subsidization through tax exemptions
for a fraction of export profits, foreign tax credit,5 and export credit subsidies.
It appears quite surprising that, in front of this, trade economists do not have clear and
unambiguous arguments to explain why export subsidies could be the optimal unilateral trade
policy. Building on the recent literature on endogenous market structures (see Etro, 2004, 2006,
2007a,b, 2010), this article provides such an argument, studying a model of trade policy for a
foreign market characterized by strategic interactions and endogenous entry of international
firms.6
In general, a government may tax or subsidize domestic firms that are active in international
markets for profit shifting reasons: The right policy allows the government to turn the domestic
firm into a leader in the international competition, and to increase the net profits for the
country. For instance, when a domestic firm competes against a foreign competitor in a third
market, it is typically optimal to tax exports under competition in prices and to subsidize
exports under competition in quantities: The reason is that in the former case a tax turns the
domestic firm into an accommodating leader that softens price competition and earns higher
profits, and in the latter case a subsidy turns the domestic firm into an aggressive leader that
increases its production and earns higher profits as well. When entry in the international market
is endogenous, the same general principle applies, but the only way for the domestic firm to
earn positive profits is by adopting an aggressive strategy, either reducing prices or increasing
production so as to conquer market shares and reduce average costs below those of the other
firms (any accommodating strategy would end up attracting entry, and profits would vanish).
Therefore, it is now unambiguously optimal to subsidize exports to turn the domestic firm into
an aggressive leader under both competition in prices and quantities.
3 These conditions are derived by Dixit (1984) and Klette (1994). See also Horstmann and Markusen (1986) for
related results.
4 The literature has developed other arguments against export subsidies, as in case of asymmetric information between
firms and government or in case of retaliation (see Brander, 1995, for reviews of the literature).
5 See Desai and Hines (2008).
6 Notice that free entry is a realistic assumption because a foreign country without a domestic firm in the market can
only gain from allowing free entry of international firms (see Boone et al., 2006, for a related discussion). Moreover,
endogenous entry is the standard assumption of the new trade literature based on monopolistic competition (Krugman,
1980); therefore it is surprising that it has not been used in the strategic trade literature. For a review of the applications
of the endogenous market structures approach to trade and dynamic issues, see Etro (2009, Ch. 3–4) and Etro and
Colciago (2010). For an important work that endogenizes the number of firms and of the exporting firms in a general
equilibrium framework, see Ghironi and Melitz (2005).
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This article characterizes the optimal unilateral trade policy for a large class of models and
analyzes a few examples. In the case of homogenous goods, U-shaped cost functions, and
competition in quantities, the optimal unilateral export subsidy is a fraction 1/ of the price,
where  is again the elasticity of demand: Notice that this is the exact opposite of the traditional
neoclassical optimal policy. Product differentiation and competition in prices tend to reduce
the optimal export subsidy.
The same argument can be applied to other forms of indirect export promotion, as poli-
cies that boost demand or decrease transport costs for the exporting firms, R&D subsidies (or
strengthening of IPRs protection) for domestic firms competing in global markets, and com-
petitive devaluations of the nominal exchange rate for firms active in foreign markets with
endogenous entry: As long as these policies increase the marginal profitability of the domestic
firms, there is a strategic incentive to use them unilaterally.
Finally, our result on the optimal trade policy holds also in an equilibrium analysis where all
the countries can choose optimally their policy, and entry of firms in the international market is
endogenous. We verify this in a model of competition in quantities with homogenous goods and
increasing marginal costs, and we find out that the Nash equilibrium export subsidy remains the
same as the unilateral optimal one for an endogenous number of countries (determined by the
size of the international market), whereas the other countries commit to free trade.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a general model and determines
the strategic incentives to promote exports in the presence of an exogenous number of firms
in the international market and with an endogenous market structure. Subsequently, it applies
these general results to strategic trade policy, and derives the optimal unilateral export subsidies
under competition in quantities and competition in prices. Section 3 develops aNash equilibrium
analysis for the case in which multiple countries can simultaneously choose their strategic trade
policy. Section 4 discusses other applications of the optimal unilateral policy: It studies the
incentives to adopt R&D subsidies for domestic firms engaged in an international patent race
and the role of exchange rate policy in supporting exporters. Section 5 concludes. Technical
details are left in the Appendix.
2. THE MODEL
I adopt a general model of market structures introduced in Etro (2006, 2008a), use it to de-
scribe competition in an international market, and augment it by introducing export promoting
policies.
Consider an international market where n firms from different countries are competing in
Nash strategies. Let us assume that each firm chooses a strategic variable xi, with i = 1, 2, . . . ,n,
which delivers the net profit function
πi = i(xi, βi, si) − F,(1)
where F is the fixed cost. The function βi =
∑n
k=1,k =i h(xk) aggregates the strategies of the
other firms, with h(·) positive, differentiable, and increasing. As we will see, the separability
property that is assumed in the βi function is satisfied by a large class of models of competition in
quantities and in prices, and in other models as well. I assume that(xi, βi, si) is quasiconcave in
xi with11 < 0.7 Because themain focus of the analysis will be on free entry equilibria, I assume
that an increase in βi reduces the profits of firm i : 2 < 0. In general 12 could be positive, so
that we have strategic complementarity, or negative, so that we have strategic substitutability.
Finally, si is the export policy chosen by the government of country i: in my main application,
this will be an export subsidy, but I will take in consideration other policies as well. Without loss
of generality, an increase in the policy raises profits (3 > 0); therefore si will be defined as an
export promotion policy for country i. I allow13 to be positive or negative: only in the first case,
7 The subindex of the profit function refers to derivatives with respect to the corresponding argument.
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the policy increases marginal profitability. As I verify later, all forms of trade subsidies under
quantity and price competition imply 13 > 0, but other indirect forms of export promotion
can be characterized by 13 < 0.
In general, the welfare of country i depends positively on the profits of the domestic firm and
negatively on the cost of its policy si, say C(si), so that we can express welfare as
W(si) = i (xi, βi, si) − C(si) − F.(2)
In case of export subsidization, the cost of trade policy is the collection of tax revenue, but
this may imply tax distortions or other kinds of costs due to general equilibrium or political
considerations.Moreover, in the presence of lobbying activity, theweight givenby thepoliticians
to the costs of the policy may be variable. Finally, other forms of export promotion can have
different costs for national welfare. Nevertheless, in line with the literature on strategic trade
policy, my focus will be mainly on the strategic incentive to export promotion, which will be
defined as the indirect marginal benefit of an increase in si on the profit:
SIi = i2 (xi, βi, si)
∂βi
∂si
.(3)
As long as this is positive, the government of country i has a strategic reason to promote
exports beyond any direct reason that depends on the first-order impact of policy on welfare.8
I now present a few examples of market structures that are nested in the general model.
As a first example let us consider models of competition in quantities. In particular, allowing
for imperfect substitutability between goods, we can adopt an indirect demand for good i as
pi = p [xi,
∑n
k=1,k =i h(xk)] with p1 < 0 and p2 < 0; of course the case of homogenous goods is a
particular case emerging when the inverse demand depends on the total production only, pi =
p(X) with X = ∑nk=1 xk. The cost function, which includes transport costs, can be expressed as
c(xi) with c′(·) > 0. It follows that, in the absence of any policy, the general expression for gross
profits is given by
i(xi, βi, 0) = xip(xi, βi) − c(xi),(4)
where βi =
∑n
k=1,k =i h(xk).
As a second example let us consider a general class ofmodels of price competition.Anymodel
with direct demandDi = D[pi,
∑n
j=1,j =i g(p j )], whereD1 < 0,D2 < 0, g(p) > 0, and g
′(p) < 0,
is nested in my general framework after adopting the monotonic transformation xi ≡ 1/pi with
h(x) = g(1/x), so that h′(x) = −g′(1/x)/x2 > 0. Under constant marginal costs, gross profits
become
i(xi, βi, 0) =
(
1
xi
− c
)
D
(
1
xi
, βi
)
.(5)
We will assume that strategic complementarity typically holds (12 > 0).9 As we will see later
on, examples include many well-known demand functions such as the class of demand functions
derived by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the Logit demand, and the class of demand functions with
constant expenditure. An important case that is nested in this specification is the model of price
competition with isoelastic demand, which has been widely employed in the new trade theory
(Krugman, 1980; Helpman and Krugman, 1985).
In these basic models of the market structure, we can introduce different policies for export
promotion. In the rest of this section, I will derive the general results in two crucial cases: in the
8 In general, the optimal policy satisfies an optimality condition asi3(xi, βi, si) + SIi = C′(si), where the first and the
last term represent the direct marginal benefits and costs of the policy.
9 The condition for strategic complementarity is D2 + (p − c)D12 > 0.
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first one the foreign market structure is exogenous, in the sense that there is a fixed number of
firms (and I replicate the existing results in the literature), in the second one the foreign market
is characterized by an endogenous structure, in the sense that entry is free or endogenous.
2.1. Strategic Policy with ExogenousMarket Structures. Let us briefly summarize the results
on the optimal unilateral trade policy for a foreign market with a fixed number of firms. More
specifically, assume that si = 0 for all firms except the domestic one, whose policy s is chosen by
the government of its home country at an initial stage. Consider the second stage after a policy
s has been chosen and assume that a unique Nash equilibrium exists with the same strategy for
the foreign firms, say x, and a different strategy for the domestic one, say z, depending on the
policy s. The first-order equilibrium conditions are10
1[x, (n − 2)h(x) + h(z), 0] = 0,(6)
H1 [z, (n − 1)h(x), s] = 0,(7)
which provide the equilibrium strategies of the domestic firm and of the international ones as
functions of the policy. Changes in the domestic policy affect the strategies of all the firms. For
instance, in caseH13 > 0 (which will always be the case when the policy is export subsidization),
one can verify that an increase in s is always going to increase the domestic strategy z and
to increase the strategy of the international firms x if and only if strategic complementarity
(12 > 0) holds.
In the initial stage, the government chooses the policy to maximize welfare taking these
reactions into account. In the Appendix, I derive the strategic incentive to export promotion as
SIH = (n − 1)h
′(x)h′(z)H2 12
H
13

,(8)
where  > 0 is the determinant of the equilibrium system. When H13 > 0 this effect is positive
under strategic substitutability (12 < 0) and negative under strategic complementarity (12 >
0): In the former case an increase in thepolicy is going to reduce the strategies of the international
firms and increase the profits of the domestic one, and in the latter case the opposite holds. All
the results are inverted when 13 < 0. It is now immediate to conclude with:
PROPOSITION 1. When the number of firms is exogenous in the foreign market, (a) if the export
policy increases the marginal profitability of the domestic firm, there is (not) a strategic incentive
to promote exports if strategic substitutability (complementarity) holds; (b) if the export policy
decreases the marginal profitability of the domestic firm, the opposite holds.
Notice that with just one domestic firm, the kind of policy does not depend on the number of
international firms. The optimal policy implies an aggressive firm under strategic substitutability
and an accommodating one under strategic complementarity. However, the result is sensitive
to the number of domestic firms: If this is large enough, there is a bias against export promotion
(Dixit, 1984; Klette, 1994). In conclusion, the results on the optimal export policy are ambiguous
when the market structures are exogenous.
2.2. Strategic Policy with Endogenous Market Structures. From the previous section we can
infer that in standard models of competition in quantities and in prices, the foreign country
gains from an increase in the number of international firms whenever this increases production
10 Given the symmetric equilibrium, I will drop the index i for the international firms and use the index H for the
domestic one.
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or reduces the equilibrium prices. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate what happens when
we allow for free entry in the foreign market.
I assume that the number of potential entrants is great enough that a zero profit condition
pins down the effective number of firms competing in the foreign market.11 The equilibrium
conditions are the two first-order conditions, (6) and (7), and the zero profit condition that binds
on the international firms (because these do not profit from the optimal export policy):
[x, (n − 2)h(x) + h(z), 0] = F.(9)
Totally differentiating the system (6)–(9), we obtain a fundamental result for what follows (see
the Appendix):
PROPOSITION 2. Under free entry in the foreign market, a change in the export policy does not
affect the equilibrium strategy of all the other firms but only their equilibrium number.
When the domestic policy is changed, themarginal profitability of the strategy of the domestic
firm changes, and its optimal strategy changes as well. Nevertheless, the policy change does not
affect the marginal profitability for the other firms, and any impact on the market structure
emerges through an impact on the number of competitors.12
More specifically, notice that optimization by the foreign firms and the free entry condition
constraining their number pin down both the strategy of each firm and the level of spillovers
that each firm receives from the strategies of the other international firms and the domestic firm,
namely, both x and β, which are therefore both independent from s. Because the domestic policy
affects the strategy of the domestic firmbut not the aggregate statisticsβ = (n − 2)h(x) + h[z(s)],
it follows that the number of firms must be influenced by the domestic policy. In particular, we
have
dn
ds
= h
′(z)H13/h(x)
H11 − h′(z)H12
 0 if H13  0,
dz
ds
= − 
H
13
H11 − h′(z)H12
 0 if H13  0.
Apolicy that makes the domestic firmmore aggressive must reduce the number of international
firms that can profitably be active in equilibrium, and vice versa.
In the initial stage, the government will choose the policy to maximize welfare. Using the
envelope theorem and the previous results, we obtain the new strategic incentive to promote
exports:
SIH = h
′(z)H2 
H
13
H11 − h′(z)H12
.(10)
Its sign is simply the sign of 13, therefore we can conclude with:
PROPOSITION 3. Under free entry in the foreign market, when the export policy increases
(decreases) the marginal profitability of the domestic firm, there is (not) a strategic incentive to
promote exports.
11 As customary, we consider n as a natural number in all the article (except when dealing with entry deterrence).
12 This result depends on the symmetric properties of the profit functions.
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Notice that the result would not change in the presence of more than one domestic firm, as
long as some entry of foreign firms takes place in equilibrium.13
In conclusion, governments would always gain from unilateral commitments to implement
export promoting policies that induce an aggressive behavior of domestic firms active in global
markets that are open to entry.14 Notice that the above analysis takes as given the policies of
the other countries: Later, I will present an equilibrium analysis in which all countries choose
their policies independently.
In the rest of this section I will apply my general results to the theory of strategic trade policy.
I will derive the optimal strategic unilateral trade policy in different models. The focus will be
on specific subsidies, but similar results could be obtained with ad valorem subsidies.
2.2.1. Optimal export subsidy with Cournot competition. Consider the general model of
quantity competition that allows for imperfect substitutability between goods and general cost
functions. The gross profit of the domestic firm in the presence of a specific export subsidy is
H = z[p(z, βH) + s] − c(z),(11)
where we remember that z is the production of the domestic firm, p(·) is the inverse demand
depending on the spillovers from the production of other firms, βH, c(·) is the cost function, and
s is the subsidy. This profit function is clearly characterized by H13 = 1 > 0. The equilibrium
first-order conditions in the second stage where Nash competition takes place in the foreign
market are
p(x, β) + xp1(x, β) = c′(x),
s + p(z, βH) + zp1(z, βH) = c′(z),
where β = (n − 2)h(x) + h(z) is the spillover received by an international firm from the strate-
gies of all the other firms in the market and βH ≡ (n − 1)h(x) is the spillover received by the
domestic firm.
Let us now consider free entry. In the second stage we have also the zero profit condition
xp(x, β) = c(x) + F.
The equilibrium system expresses production levels and the number of firms as functions of
the subsidy s, but we know from Proposition 2 that the production of foreign firms x and their
spillovers β are actually unaffected by changes in the subsidy, whereas z(s) and βH(s) depend
on it. Consequently, we can write the welfare of the domestic country (2) as the profits of the
domestic firm net of the tax revenue necessary to finance the subsidy
W(s) = z(s)p(z(s), βH(s)) − c[z(s)] − F
= z(s)p [z(s), β + h(x) − h(z)] − c[z(s)] − F
(12)
whose maximization has an interior solution (without entry deterrence) if goods are imperfect
substitutes or/and if marginal costs are increasing enough. If such an interior solution exists, it
13 Actually, it is immediate to verify that with nH domestic firms, the equilibrium strategy of each firm would not
change and the strategic incentive to promote exports would just be SI(nH) = nHSI(1). Under free entry there is not a
terms of trade effect induced by an export promoting policy (which is present with entry barriers; see Dixit, 1984).
14 The result holds for markets in which a single domestic firm is active and subsidized. One should keep in mind that
when other domestic firms are subsidized and endogenously enter in the market, entry would drive net domestic profits
to zero. Venables (1985) studies a particular example of this case. See also Markusen and Venables (1988). Brander
(1995) summarizes the results on entry for the reciprocal-markets model.
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must satisfy the first-order condition
p(z(s), βH) + z(s) [p1(z(s), βH) − p2(z(s), βH)h′(z)] = c′[z(s)],(13)
which is a complicated implicit expression.However, if we substitute this in the equilibrium first-
order condition for the domestic firm, we can derive the following expression for the optimal
export subsidy:
s∗H = [−p2(z, βH)h′(z)] z > 0.(14)
It is interesting to derive the optimal subsidy for the case of homogenous goods: In such a
case, an interior solution exists only if the marginal costs of production are increasing enough.
When this is the case, the equilibrium price p(X) is independent from the production of the
domestic firm and from the subsidy because free entry for the international (not subsidized)
firms determines total production (and the price) independently from both of them. Given this,
the optimal subsidy simplifies to
s∗H =
p

> 0,(15)
which is decreasing in the elasticity of demand (with respect to domestic production)  ≡
−p/zp ′.15 It is important to remark that our expression for the optimal export subsidy is the
exact opposite of the traditional neoclassical optimal trade policy for markets with homogenous
goods. The latter requires an export tax inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand, so as
to increase the price of exports compared to that of imports, i.e., to improve the terms of trade
(Lerner, 1934). In our framework, an export subsidy of the samemagnitude reduces the price of
exports to conquer market shares in the foreign market and raise profits. The intuition behind
these two specular results is simple: In both cases the distortions due to the policy increase
with demand elasticity; therefore high elasticity recommends lower intervention. However, the
optimal neoclassical policy is aimed at increasing the price of exports, whereas the optimal
policy in our case of endogenous market structures is aimed at decreasing the price of exports.
Notice that the optimal policy implies that the domestic firm produces until its marginal cost
equates the equilibrium price (p = c′(z)) and enjoys positive profits because returns to scale
are decreasing at its production level.16 Nevertheless, when the elasticity of foreign demand
increases, the optimal subsidy decreases. In the limit case of a perfectly elastic demand, which
matches the case of a small open economy whose policy does not affect international equilibria,
we reach the traditional outcome for which free trade is the optimal policy.
As an example, consider the case of a linear inverse demand p = a − X, where X is total
production, and a convex cost function that we assume to be quadratic for simplicity, with
c(x) = x2/2. Looking at the Cournot equilibrium between n firms for a given subsidy s for the
domestic one and imposing the free entry condition, we obtain the equilibrium production for
each international firm:
x =
√
2F
3
and the number of firms:
n = (a − s/2)
√
3/2F − 2,
15 Notice that p is independent from the production of the domestic firm and from the subsidy because free entry for
the international (not subsidized) firms determines total production (and the price) independently from both of them.
16 Notice that the optimal subsidy would be the same in the presence of other domestic firms: There is not a terms of
trade effect because the equilibrium price is independent from the subsidy, whereas domestic firms crowd out foreign
firms.
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which imply total production X = a −√8F/3 and price p = √8F/3. Consistently with Propo-
sition 2, the subsidy does not affect the individual production of the other firms, but decreases
their number. The equilibrium production of the subsidized firm is instead z(s) = √2F/3 + s/2,
which generates net profits πH = (3/8)(s +
√
8F/3)2 − F . The government maximizes profits
net of the tax revenue necessary to finance the subsidies:
W(s) = z(s)
√
8F
3
− z(s)
2
2
− F.(16)
This welfare function is maximized by
s∗H =
√
8F
3
> 0,(17)
which implies that the domestic firm produces the double than any other international firm. Its
net profits are πH = 3F and domestic welfare is W = F/3.17 We will return to this example in
the next section.
When the welfare maximization has a corner solution, the optimal subsidy is high enough to
deter entry of international firms. It is easy to verify that this outcome emerges in the relevant
case of homogenous goods and constant marginal costs of production.18 Intuitively, the same
outcome will occur for high levels of substitutability between products or/and the cost function
is not increasing too much with the production level.
The prohibitive subsidy is the one that eliminates profits for any potential entrant. Formally,
because we defined n as the total number of firms including the domestic one, the prohibitive
subsidy must be (an epsilon larger than) the one that induces exactly zero profits for a single
entrant, that is, the one satisfying n = 2. Therefore, the prohibitive subsidy is implicitly given
by the following condition:19
xp [x, z(s∗H)] − c(x) = F.(18)
The intuition for the optimality of the prohibitive subsidy is the following. Free entry pins
down the equilibrium price level as long as some of the foreign firms enter. This implies that the
choice of the subsidy does not affect the equilibrium price at which the domestic firm will sell its
17 Notice that when the fixed cost of entry decreases, the level of concentration in the market is reduced and the
optimal subsidy goes down: In the limit case of perfect competition (zero fixed costs) we obtain the traditional result
for which free trade is optimal.
18 In order to verify this, notice that for low values of the subsidy that allow entry of international firms, welfare
(12) becomes W(s) = z(s)p(X) − cz(s) − F , where the equilibrium price is independent from the subsidy and c is the
constant marginal cost of production. Given this, welfare is always increasing in the subsidy (because p(X) > c) and it
is optimal to set it high enough to deter entry.
19 For instance, let us consider the case of homogenous goods with a linear demand p = a − X and constant marginal
cost c. Imagining that there is entry in equilibrium and imposing the free entry condition for a given subsidy s, we
obtain the equilibrium production for each international firm x = √F and the number of firms n = (a − c − s)/√F − 1,
which imply total productionX = a − c − √F . The equilibrium production of the subsidized firm is z(s) = √F + s. The
government maximizes profits net of the tax revenue necessary to finance the subsidies
W(s) =
√
F (
√
F + s) − F.
Because this is always an increasing function of s, it is optimal to increase subsidization as long as there is entry. But
entry is deterred for any subsidy larger than
s∗H = a − c − 3
√
F > 0,
which makes it impossible for a single entrant to be active (with n ≥ 2, the single entrant obtains non-positive profits).
This prohibitive subsidy is the optimal one and generates total production z = a − c − 2√F , which is below the free
trade level.
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production, but it does increase its market share. Because there are fixed costs of production,
an increase in the market share reduces average costs, and therefore it increases net profits.
Consequently, it is optimal to raise the market share as much as possible, which amounts to full
entry deterrence.
Summing up, we have
PROPOSITION 4. Under competition in quantities with free entry, the optimal unilateral trade
policy requires always a positive export subsidy.With homogenous goods and increasingmarginal
costs, the optimal subsidy is a fraction 1/ of the price, where  is the elasticity of the international
demand.
2.2.2. Optimal export subsidy with Bertrand competition. Consider our general model of
price competition with a (specific) export subsidy, so that the gross profit function for the
domestic firm is
H = (pH − c + s)D(pH, βH),(19)
where we remember that D(·) is the direct demand depending on the price of the domestic
firm pH and on the spillovers from the prices of the other firms βH. This profit function clearly
satisfies H13 = −p 2HD1 > 0.
As pointed out first by Eaton and Grossman (1986), the optimal trade policy under barriers
to entry requires an export tax. Here, however, we will focus on the case of free entry, in which
the equilibrium conditions in the second stage and the zero profit condition are
(p − c)D1(p, β) + D(p, β) = 0
(pH − c + s)D1(pH, βH) + D(pH, βH) = 0
(p − c)D(p, β) = F,
where β = (n − 2)g(p) + g(pH) is the spillover received by an international firm from the
strategies of all the other firms in the market and βH = (n − 1)g(p) is the spillover for the
domestic firm. This system expresses prices and the number of firms as functions of the subsidy
s, but we know from Proposition 2 that the price of foreign firms p and their spillovers β are
independent from the subsidy, whereas pH(s) and βH(s) depend on it. Therefore, assuming that
the cost of the subsidy is simply given by the tax revenue necessary to finance it, we can write
the welfare of the domestic country (2) as
W(s) = [pH(s) − c]D[pH(s), βH(s)] − F
= [pH(s) − c]D[pH(s), β + g(p) − g(pH)] − F,
(20)
which is maximized by a subsidy satisfying the first-order condition
D(pH, βH) + (pH − c)[D1(pH, βH) − D2(pH, βH)g′(pH)] = 0.(21)
If we now substitute this in the equilibrium first-order condition for the domestic firm, we can
derive the following expression for the optimal export subsidy:
s∗H =
(pH − c)D2(pH, βH)g′(pH)
[−D1(pH, βH)] > 0.(22)
ENDOGENOUS MARKET STRUCTURES AND STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY 73
Also this is an implicit expression, because on the right-hand side pH depends on the optimal
subsidy; however this expression makes clear our main point: The optimal export subsidy must
be positive.
Summarizing, under price competition and free entry, an export subsidy is always optimal,
because it helps the domestic firm to lower its price in the foreign market. The result overturns
common wisdom for models with strategic complementarity and barriers to entry. An accom-
modating behavior is not anymore optimal because it would just induce new firms to enter.
The only chance for the government to increase the profits of the domestic firm is to induce
an aggressive behavior: The domestic firm undercuts its competitors, gains market shares, and
spreads a low markup over a large portion of the market, leaving the few remaining firms with
zero profits. This outcome can only be reached with an export subsidy. Summing up, we have:
PROPOSITION 5. Under competition in prices with free entry, the optimal unilateral trade policy
requires always a positive export subsidy.
An explicit characterization can be obtained in the case of a Logit demand,
Di = Ye
−ξpi
n∑
j=1
e−ξp j
,
with Y > 0 representing total demand in the sector and with ξ > 0. In this case, international
firms choose the price p = c + F/Y + 1/ξ, and it is easy to derive that the optimal subsidy
must induce a price for the domestic firm equal to pH(s∗H) = c + 1/ξ, which requires an optimal
export subsidy equal to
s∗H =
F
Y
> 0.(23)
Notice that when the size of the fixed costs relative to the size of the market decreases, the
endogenous level of concentration in the market is reduced and the optimal subsidy is lower.
Another explicit result for the optimal export subsidy can be derived in models with isoelastic
demand that can be microfounded in a standard way and are widely used in international trade
theory. Consider a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) demand function as20
Di = Yp
− 11−θ
i
(1 + α)
n∑
j=1
p
− θ1−θ
j
,
In this case the optimal export subsidy, derived in the Appendix, determines an equilibrium
price pH(s∗H) = c/θ for the domestic firm that is lower than the equilibrium price of the other
international firms p = cY/θ[Y − F (1 + α)]. However, one can verify that the reduction in the
number of these international firms maintains the price index at the same level as under free
trade.
20 This can be derived from the utility function:
U = Cα0
⎡
⎣ n∑
j=1
Cθj
⎤
⎦
1
θ
,
with θ ∈ (0, 1) and α > 0, to bemaximized under the budget constraintC0 +
∑n
j=1 p jCj = Y , whereC0 is the numeraire.
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3. EQUILIBRIUM TRADE POLICY
In this section we provide an equilibrium analysis for the case in which multiple countries
choose their export promotion policies.21 In order to appreciate the importance of this analysis,
consider first the traditional case where there are two countries with two firms active in a third
market, and both countries independently choose an export subsidy. This situation, studied first
by Brander and Spencer (1985) in a model of competition in quantities with strategic substi-
tutability, generates an inefficient symmetric Nash equilibrium in which both countries engage
in excessive subsidization of their exports: Although export subsidies are unilaterally optimal,
they are jointly suboptimal (for the countries involved) when one considers equilibrium behav-
ior. Analogously, in case of strategic complementarity, the Nash equilibrium is characterized by
suboptimal export taxation by both countries.22 These results depend again on the exogeneity
of the market structure.
Let us consider the general case where each one of m countries can subsidize or tax the
exports of a single national firm to an international market, but the number of firms that are
ultimately active in the market is endogenous. The timing of the game is the following23:
(1) m countries independently choose their export subsidies (taxes if negative) s =
[s1, s2 , . . . , sm] maximize their welfare functions Wi—the definition of welfare extends
(12) to take in consideration that domestic profits net of the cost of the domestic subsidy
may also depend on foreign subsidies;
(2) simultaneous entry of n firms occurs endogenously; and
(3) all the n active firms independently choose their strategies xi to maximize their profits
πi.
Wewill provide a constructive approach to the equilibrium analysis focusing on an example of
competition in quantities with homogenous goods where the demand is linear, p = a − X, and
the cost function is quadratic, c(x) = x2/2 (already used in Section 2.2.1). The main intuitions
extend to the case of general demand and cost functions.24
Solving for the subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies by backward induction, we
will show that the Nash equilibrium trade policy is characterized by a limited and endogenous
number of countries adopting the same unilaterally optimal export subsidy and by the other
countries committing to free trade.
Let us consider stage (3) first. The set of subsidies is given and, without loss of generality, we
order the countries by decreasing subsidies: s1 ≥ s2 ≥ · · · ≥ sm. At this stage also the number of
active firms n is known. The Cournot equilibrium implies production xi = (a − X + si)/2 and
profits πi = 3x2i /2 − F for each one of them. Summing up to obtain total production X(n, s) =
(an +∑nj=1 sj )/(2 + n), we notice that this is increasing in the number of active firms and in
their subsidy. This allows us to express the production level of each firm as
xi(n, s) = a2 + n +
1
2
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝si −
n∑
j=1
sj
2 + n
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ .(24)
21 I am extremely thankful to a referee for pointing out this case and leading to its characterization in the case of
competition in quantities.
22 The same happens under competition in prices. As is well known, also competitive devaluations lead to inefficient
equilibrium behavior.
23 We assume that the number of countries (and potential firms) is high enough that n < m in equilibrium. Otherwise,
the game would revert to one with an exogenous number of firms. For simplicity, we also assume that when a country
cannot induce entry of its firm and cannot improve welfare by means of an active policy (a subsidy or a tax), the country
commits to free trade.
24 The details are available from the author on request.
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Let us move to stage (2). As usual in this literature, we neglect the integer constraint on the
number of firms: This is a good approximation as long as the equilibrium number of firms is
large enough (i.e., a is large enough). The profits of the active firms can be ranked according
to their own subsidies: Firms receiving lower subsidies obtain lower profits. As a consequence,
there must be a marginal firm obtaining zero profits. The free entry condition determining n is
πn = 0 and requires that the production of the marginal firm is given by xn =
√
2F/3 and the
total production is X(sn) = a + sn −
√
8F/3, which depends positively on the critical subsidy
sn.25 This generates an equilibrium price depending on the crucial subsidy as follows:
p(X(sn)) =
√
8F
3
− sn.(25)
The equilibrium production for each active firm can be derived as follows:
xi =
√
2F
3
+ si − sn
2
.(26)
Summarizing, given any set of national subsidies, the most subsidized firmsmust be active in the
market, with the marginal firm producing enough to break even and the other firms producing
a quantity that is increasing in their subsidy. The number of active firms depends on all the
subsidies according to the following relation:
n =
2a −
n∑
j=1
sj
√
8F
3
− sn
− 2.
Finally, let us move to stage (1). In order to characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium we
need to find a set of subsidies such that each one maximizes the welfare of the corresponding
country (domestic profits net of the cost of the subsidy) taking as given the other subsidies and
the equilibrium of the subgames.26
We first establish an equilibrium requirement for the countries i < n that are defined by
construction as the countries with active firms obtaining positive profits. Using (25) and (26),
the welfare Wi of a country i < n can be expressed as
W(si, sn) = xi[p(X(sn)) + si] − x
2
i
2
− F − sixi
=
(√
2F
3
+ si − sn
2
)(√
8F
3
− sn
)
− 1
8
(
si − sn +
√
8F
3
)2
− F.
(27)
25 This relies on the assumption that the equilibrium number of firms is a natural number. If this was not the case,
the equilibrium number should be the smallest integer n
 satisfying xn
(n
, s) ≥
√
2F/3 and xn
+1(n
 + 1, s) <
√
2F/3.
Of course, this number would depend on the full set of subsidies.
26 The characterization of the equilibrium below relies on the assumption that the equilibrium number of firms is a
natural number. If this was not the case, the integer number of firms in equilibrium n
 would depend on the subsidy of
countries 1, 2, . . . , n
, n
 + 1, and each active country would choose its subsidy to maximize
Wi(s) = 3xi(n
, s)2/2 − F − sixi(n
, s)
taking as given the other subsidies. Closed form solutions for the equilibrium subsidies are not available. The approx-
imation in the text, which considers n as a natural number, allows us to derive explicitly the equilibrium subsidies,
number of firms, and strategies.
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Its maximization for si taking as given sn delivers
s∗(sn) =
√
8F
3
− sn,(28)
which depends negatively on the critical subsidy.27 In equilibrium, each country i < n must
adopt this subsidy.
I now claim that the equilibrium must imply si = 0 for all the countries i ≥ n and therefore
that there are no profitable deviations from free trade for all of these countries.
Consider the marginal country n. With a slight abuse of notation, we define this country by
construction as the country whose subsidy sn ∈ (sn+1, sn−1) leads its firm to break even in the
last stage. This country could only avoid this outcome with a unilateral deviation as sˆ ≥ sn−1
or sˆ < sn+1.28 I now show that this country cannot gain from both kinds of deviation. First,
consider a deviation with a positive and large subsidy sˆ ≥ sn−1 = s∗(0). Then country n would
not be the marginal country anymore. In the subgame equilibrium following the deviation,
country n − 1 would become the marginal country with its subsidy s∗(0) = √8F/3. However,
from (27) it emerges that W(sˆ, s∗(0)) ≤ 0 for any deviation sˆ; therefore, such a deviation from
the equilibrium strategy cannot be profitable. Second, consider a unilateral deviation with a
negative subsidy sˆ < sn+1 = 0. This would lead to the exit of the national firm (in favor of
another unsubsidized firm) without inducing any welfare gain compared to the equilibrium
strategy; therefore, also this deviation from the equilibrium strategy cannot be profitable.
Consider now the other countries i > n. In the proposed equilibrium they choose free trade,
but their firms do not enter in the international market. These countries cannot gain from
unilateral deviations for analogous reasons to those of the marginal country: A positive subsidy
inducing entry of the national firm would reduce welfare, and a negative one would not change
the outcome of the game.
In conclusion, the equilibrium generates the same optimal unilateral subsidy found in (17)
for an endogenous number of countries and free trade for the others:
s∗H =
√
8F
3
for i < n, s∗H = 0 for i ≥ n
where n is given by
n = 1
2
(
a
√
3
2F
− 1
)
.
In this example, all firms receiving a positive subsidy produce the double of the marginal firm
and obtain positive net profits πi = 3F for i = 1, 2, . . . ,n − 1, but the number of countries able
to exploit the advantages of strategic export subsidization is limited by the size of the market.
In our example, each one of these countries obtains a welfare gain W = F/3 relative to free
trade—but notice that the equilibrium price remains at the free trade level p = √8F/3 (which
shows a Pareto improvement of the allocation of resources).
In general, the welfare gain is identical for all the countries that actively subsidize their firms,
and the same as in the case of a unilateral optimal policy—indeed, even through coordination
those countries could not reach a better outcome. In other words, in the presence of endogenous
market structures, strategic trade policy is not a beggar-thy-neighbor policy in the traditional
27 Notice that s∗(sn) ≥ sn , as required by construction, if sn ≤ s∗(sn)/2.
28 This depends again on the assumption that n is a natural number such that the marginal firm breaks even. As a
consequence of this, a deviation given by a small increase in the subsidy to sˆ ∈ (0, sn−1) does not change the equilibrium
strategy and the equilibrium (zero) profits of the national firm, but simply increases the total output and reduces the
price. Accordingly, the deviation does not increase net profits but has a welfare cost due to the cost of the subsidy.
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sense. Nevertheless, only a limited number of countries can exploit the benefits of this policy:
The adoption of export subsidies by some countries induces the exit of international firms
compared to the free trade equilibrium.
The result can be easily extended to general demand and cost functions29: The important point
is that the traditional conclusion for which export promotion is unilaterally optimal but jointly
suboptimal does not appear to be robust in the presence of endogenous market structures, at
least under Cournot competition. It would be interesting to extend the results to other models.
4. APPLICATIONS
In this section, we apply our general analysis of the optimal unilateral policy to other policies
for international markets whose structure is endogenous. Beyond subsidization, many other
policies can affect the profits of exporting firms: for instance, policies that increase demand for
the domestic product, reduce transport costs for exporting firms, or promote R&D (Spencer
and Brander, 1983). In the first subsection, we evaluate the incentives to adopt R&D subsidies
or to strengthen IPRs protection, which provides a strategic advantage for domestic firms
participating to the competition for international markets. In the following subsection, we
evaluate the strategic incentives of the monetary authority of a country to intervene unilaterally
on a fixed exchange rate to support domestic firms active abroad.
4.1. R&D Policy. In this section, I briefly address the role of R&D policy in supporting do-
mestic firms active abroad. R&Dpolicy is quite relevant for high-tech industries: Its main aspect
involves R&D subsidies, but there are other forms of R&D promotion as public investment
in complementary R&D or the strengthening of the protection of intellectual property rights
(IPRs) for the domestic firms. One can analyze the role of unilateral R&D policy focusing on
the competition for international markets rather than the competition in international markets.
Traditional models of patent races are nested in our general framework and can be used to
study R&D policy for firms investing in some forms of innovation to conquer foreign markets.
For instance, consider a standard international patent race where each firm i invests a flow of
investment xi in the continuous time. This investment delivers innovations according to a stan-
dard Poisson stochastic process characterized by an instantaneous arrival rate of innovations
h(xi), which is a positive and concave function. When one of the firms innovates, it obtains a
rentV and the race is over. The R&D subsidy si is assumed to be proportional to the investment
flow. Given a constant interest rate r, the expected profit function for firm i can be expressed as
(xi, βi, si) = h(xi)V − xi(1 − si)r + h(xi) + βi ,(29)
which is clearly nested in our general functional form (1). Notice that H12 > 0 and 
H
13 > 0;
therefore, in case of a fixed number of international firms (Proposition 1), it would be optimal to
tax domestic R&D (to slow down the aggregate investment rate), whereas under the assumption
of endogenous entry in the international competition for the market (Proposition 3), a positive
R&D subsidy is always optimal. Adopting the usual procedure, it is easy to verify that the
optimal unilateral R&D subsidy satisfies
s∗H =
1
1 + V (r + βH)
h(z)V − z
∈ (0, 1),(30)
where the investments of the domestic firm, z, and of the foreign firms, x, satisfy h′(z)V =
h′(x)(V − F ) = 1. Once again, the subsidy allows the domestic firm to commit to a more
29 The details are available from the author on request.
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aggressive strategy, which is now represented by a larger investment flow. Summarizing, we
have30:
PROPOSITION 6. In a patent race between international firms, (a) when the number of firms
is exogenous it is optimal to set a R&D tax, but (b) when entry of international firms is free the
optimal unilateral R&D policy requires always to set a positive R&D subsidy.
As we noticed, the same point can be made for other aspects of R&D policy. For instance,
a strengthening of the domestic protection of IPRs can provide domestic firms with larger
incentives to invest in the competition for international markets with endogenous entry.31 The
strongAmerican position in favor of IPRs protection (and against compulsory licensing of IPRs
for antitrust purposes) could be interpreted in this sense: It provides U.S. high-tech firms with a
strategic advantage in the international competition. Until now, Europe has followed a different
path, but a strengthening of IPRs protection at the E.U. level would have positive effects in
enhancing the incentives to invest in R&D for the most dynamic European firms.
4.2. Exchange Rate Policy. An important application that deserves more attention is to
competitive devaluations adopted with the specific aim of supporting exports. Economic the-
ory is ambiguous on their merits. The traditional Mundell–Fleming model emphasizes the
beggar-thy-neighbor effects of unilateral devaluations. However, the recent new open-economy
macroeconomics shows that these devaluations can be beggar-thy self policies.32 In front of this
theoretical ambiguity it is difficult to make sense of the common wisdom according to which
unilateral devaluations provide a positive strategic advantage on the international markets. In
this section, we evaluate the strategic incentives to exchange rate devaluations in a model based
on Dornbusch (1987), where the incidence of exchange rate variations on prices is endogenous.
The effects of exchange rate policy for exporting firms crucially depend on the location of
production, on whether local currency pricing or producer currency pricing holds,33 and on
the strategic reaction of firms to the policy. In our partial equilibrium context, we will focus
on the strategic effects of a devaluation on the domestic firm. Clearly, a devaluation has other
consequences in general equilibrium, but the point here is just to understand whether the usual
claim that a devaluation gives a strategic advantage to exporting firms is correct. Our focus will
be on a particular situation where all firms produce in their domestic country, bear production
costs in domestic currency, choose their strategy taking into account the exchange rate, and
then export abroad. Under price competition this corresponds to the case of producer currency
pricing. Such a case is typical of medium and small firms that are active at a national level, often
producing typical domestic products and exporting some of them abroad, but also of larger
firms that are not directly active in the foreign market under consideration but sell their goods
to distributors in that market.34 We will study separately the cases of quantity competition and
price competition. The bottom line will be that competitive devaluations are always desirable
to provide a strategic advantage to domestic firms when entry in the foreign markets is free.35
30 A generalization of the optimal R&D subsidy within a general equilibrium model of endogenous growth can be
found in Etro (2008b).
31 Formally this derives from the fact that ∂H1 /∂V > 0.
32 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001).
33 See Engel (2000) and Betts and Devereux (2000).
34 The alternative situation, which is not relevant for our purposes, emerges when international firms produce and
compete abroad with independent production units. This is typical of multinational firms that are directly active in
other countries where they sell their products.
35 Potentially, one could extend this framework to derive an optimal competitive devaluation comparing its benefits
on the export side with its costs on the import side. However, this remains a partial equilibrium analysis. One should
always keep in mind that in general equilibrium and in the absence of pervasive market imperfections, purchasing
power parity holds, and it requires automatic adjustments of nominal variables—which undermine the effectiveness of
exchange rate policy.
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4.2.1. Competitive devaluations with Cournot competition. Imagine a foreign market with
competition in quantities. Foreign demand for good i is as usual pi = p(xi, βi), but revenues in
domestic currency areEixipi whereEi is the price of the foreign currency in terms of currency of
country i, that is, the exchange rate of this country. For expository purposes, imagine an initial
situation where, without loss of generality, all the exchange rates (with the foreign country
where firms compete) are unitary. If the domestic country can adopt a competitive devaluation
and raise the exchange rate to the level E, the profit of the domestic firm becomes
H = Ezp(z, βH) − c(z),(31)
which can be rewritten in our framework as H(z, βH, s) where s = E − 1, implying H13 =
p + zp1 = c′(z)/E > 0. Hence, our general results apply and tell us that after a devaluation the
domestic firm will increase its production level. Under barriers to entry, as long as strategic
substitutability holds, the other firms will decrease production so that the market share of the
domestic firm increases (as it was shown by Dornbusch, 1987): This creates a strategic incentive
to devaluate. Also under free entry the domestic firm expands its market share, but the other
firms produce the same as before the devaluation, and some of them exit from the market.
Applying Propositions 1 and 3, we have
PROPOSITION 7. Under quantity competition, (a) when the number of firms is exogenous there
is a strategic incentive for competitive devaluations if strategic substitutability holds and (b) when
entry is free there is always a strategic incentive for competitive devaluations.
Notice that a devaluation always increases domestic production and exports.
4.2.2. Competitive devaluations with Bertrand competition. The case of price competition
is the most interesting, because it is the usual case under study in macroeconomic models and
probably the most realistic for our purposes.
Imagine again an initial situation where all the exchange rates are unitary including the price
of the foreign currency in terms of domestic currency, E. Notice that, if p∗H is the price of
the domestic good in foreign currency, the price of the same good in domestic currency is
pH = Ep∗H. If the latter is constant, a devaluation (an increase in E) will reduce the price in
foreign currency, and an appreciation of the exchange rate will increase it. However, prices in
domestic currency for foreign segmented markets can be changed after a devaluation, and our
purpose is exactly to check how they are changed.
Because production takes place at home and demand depends on prices in foreign currency,
the relevant profit function for the domestic firm is
H = (pH − c)D
[ pH
E
,
∑
g(p∗j )
]
= (Ep∗H − c)D (p∗H, βH) ,(32)
which can be rewritten in our framework with z = 1/p∗H and s = E − 1. With such a change of
variables, the strategic variable for each firm becomes the price in foreign currency. Clearly, for
all the international firms except the domestic one, the price is the same in foreign and domestic
currency, p∗j = p j for j = H.
As usual, the incentives to change strategy for the domestic firm depend on the cross effect
H13 = −p∗2H [D+ p∗HD1], which is positive in equilibrium. Therefore, the price of the domestic
firm in foreign currency p∗H is always decreasing in the exchange rate, that is, after a devaluation.
In general, Proposition 1 implies that a competitive devaluation is not strategically desirable
under barriers to entry. Such a policy forces the domestic firm to decrease its price in foreign
currency, which induces also the other firms to do the same, reducing profits for all the firms.
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Actually, there is a strategic incentive to appreciate the currency, which induces the domestic
firm to increase its own price in foreign currency and the other firms to do the same.36
When entry is free, the domestic firm does not obtain a strategic advantage when induced to
increase its own price because this would promote entry in the foreign market. According to
Proposition 3, there is a strategic incentive to devaluate the exchange rate. This would reduce
the price of the domestic firm in the foreign currency. Foreign firms would not change their
own prices, but fewer would enter in the market, so that the market share of the domestic
firm would expand—in this case, a devaluation has also a direct beneficial effect, because it
increases revenues of the domestic firm in domestic currency.37 Summing up, the usual claim
that devaluations give a strategic advantage to exporting firms is correct only for foreignmarkets
whose structure is endogenous:
PROPOSITION 8. Under price competition, (a) when the number of firms is exogenous, there
is a strategic incentive to appreciate the domestic currency, but (b) when entry is free there is a
strategic incentive for competitive devaluations.
The bottom line is quite intuitive. Devaluations can be deleterious for exporting firms when
they induce a war between international firms to reduce prices in foreign currency, and this
happens when there are clear barriers to entry. However, when entry is free, international firms
cannot undertake such a war and the domestic firm can unilaterally decrease its price in foreign
currency, expanding its market share: Only in this case there is a strategic incentive toward
competitive devaluations.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, I adopted a simple model of endogenous market structures to show the general
optimality of unilateral export promotion policies for firms active in foreign markets. The
theoretical implications are particularly strong for markets with competition in prices: The
opening up of such markets to free entry of foreign firms would change the optimal unilateral
trade policy for the exporting countries from taxation to subsidization of the exports. This
would create profits for the domestic firm without affecting welfare in the importing country, at
least in my examples. My analysis of another interesting case, that of competition in quantities
with homogenous goods, has shown that the optimal export subsidy is inversely proportional to
the elasticity of foreign demand, just the opposite of the optimal policy within the neoclassical
framework. Moreover, the optimal subsidy creates profits for the domestic country without
affecting the equilibrium price in the importing country. Therefore, it improves the allocation of
resources compared to the free trade outcome, a result that holds also when other countries can
choose their subsidies as well. A possible policy implication is that banishing export subsidies,
one of the principles of theWTO, may not be a good idea, at least for markets with endogenous
entry at the global level. Moreover, protectionist tendencies (often emerging during crises)
could be better directed toward this form of active policy (through export subsidies) rather than
toward passive protectionism (import tariffs). The positive aspect of the former is that it does
not restrict trade volumes, but it actually promotes them.38
36 Of course, this is just the strategic incentive for the government: An appreciation would also have a negative direct
effect on profits, reducing the markup of the domestic firm, and, finally, it will induce other effects for domestic welfare
like a reduction in the price of imports.
37 The positive direct and strategic effects of a devaluation should be compared with the costs in terms of a higher
price of imports, which is beyond the scope of this discussion.
38 The typical argument against foreign export subsidies is that subsidized foreign firms exert unfair competition
against unsubsidized domestic firms. This sounds quite similar to the typical argument in favor of passive protectionism:
Since more cost-efficient foreign firms exert unfair competition toward less cost-efficient domestic firms, we should
adopt import tariffs. We believe that both arguments are flawed. In both cases, subsidized or more efficient foreign
firms end up selling goods at lower prices with clear gains for the domestic consumers. The only difference is that in the
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I have also applied my framework to show the general optimality of R&D subsidies and
protection of domestic intellectual property rights to strengthen the incentives of the domestic
firms to invest in R&D and lead the competition for international markets. Finally, I have
shown that competitive devaluations represent the optimal unilateral policy to give short-run
advantages to domestic firms engaged in competition in international markets with endogenous
entry.
Other applications may concern the strategies of multinationals with superior technologies
investing in foreign markets. As an immediate consequence of Proposition 2, these investments
would not affect the equilibrium strategy of all the other firms, but only their equilibrium
number. For instance, entry in the foreign market with a direct investment building a factory
that produces at a lower cost would induce exit of other firms, whereas the acquisition of a local
firm would not induce this effect, and would be preferred only if the fixed cost of the direct
investment is high enough or the synergies from the merger are high enough. In both cases, the
investment would be profitable for the multinational firm, without changing the strategies of
the other firms and (under homogenous goods and Cournot competition or under my examples
of Bertrand competition) without affecting welfare in the importing country.
Further theoretical research could extend these results. On one side, one could study more
complex models of interaction between firms and governments and introduce this setup in a
standard two-country framework of international trade. Moreover, it would be interesting to
extend the model of strategic trade policy for the domestic market in presence of free entry.39
On the other side, one could analyze the strategic effects of devaluations on both foreign and
domestic markets. Finally, the welfare and equilibrium analysis could be extended to more
general frameworks.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us totally differentiate the systems (6) and (7) under the stability
assumption
 ≡ H1111 + (n − 2)12H11h′(x) − (n − 1)12H12h′(x)h′(z) > 0
and
H11 + 11 + (n − 2)12h′(x) < 0,
where  > 0 is the determinant of the equilibrium system. Moreover, let us assume
11 + (n − 2)12h′(x) < 0,
which always holds under strategic substitutability, and under strategic complementarity if the
number of firms is small enough. The equilibrium strategies x = x(s) and z = z(s) are two
functions of the domestic policy s with
dx(s)
ds
= 12
H
13h
′(z)

 0 if 12H13  0,
dz(s)
ds
= − [11 + (n − 2)12h
′(x)]H13

 0 if H13  0.
former case foreign governments are paying for those gains, and in the latter case foreign workers are receiving lower
wages to provide those gains: Ultimately the costs are abroad and the gains are at home. Therefore, adopting import
tariffs or forbidding export subsidies simply reduces consumer welfare to protect domestic profits.
39 See Etro (2009) for a preliminary investigation of these topics.
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In the initial stage the government will choose the policy to maximize welfare. Using the
envelope theoremand theprevious results, weobtain the strategic incentive to export promotion
as
SI = (n − 1)h
′(x)h′(z)H2 12
H
13

,
whose sign proves the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 2. In order to verify the comparative statics of the systems (6)–(9) with
respect to s, let us use the definitions β = (n − 2)h(x) + h(z) and βH ≡ (n − 1)h(x) to rewrite it
in terms of the three unknown variables x, z, and βH:
1[x,h(z) − h(x) + βH, 0] = 0,
H1 [z, βH, s] = 0,
[x,h(z) − h(x) + βH, 0] = F.
The second equation provides an implicit relationship z = z(βH, s) with ∂z/∂βH = −H12/H11
and ∂z/∂s = −H13/H11 > 0. Substituting this expression we obtain a system of two equations in
two unknowns, x and βH
1[x,h(z(βH, s)) − h(x) + βH, 0] = 0,
[x,h(z(βH, s)) − h(x) + βH, 0] = F.
Totally differentiating the system, it follows that x = x(s), βH = βH(s), and z = z(βH(s), s) are
the equilibrium functions with the following comparative statics:
dx
ds
= 0
dβH
ds
= h
′(z)H13
H11 − h′(z)H12
 0 iff H13  0,
dz
ds
= − 
H
13[
H11 − h′(z)H12
]  0 iff H13  0.
This implies that the policy s does not affect the strategy of the foreign firms x. Moreover, since
βH ≡ (n − 1)h(x) we have n = 1 + βH/h(x) and
dn
ds
= dβH
ds
h(x)−1  0 iff H13  0,
which concludes the proof. 
Optimal export subsidy under price competition. We solve for the optimal trade policy in a
model of price competition with a demand function a la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). In order to
re-express the model presented in the text in terms of the variables of our general framework,
let us set xi ≡ 1/pi and h(xi) = x
θ
1−θ
i so that, in the presence of a specific subsidy, we have
(xi, βi, si) = x
θ
1−θ
i − (c − si)x
1
1−θ
i
(1 + α) [h(xi) + βi]Y.(A.1)
ENDOGENOUS MARKET STRUCTURES AND STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY 83
It follows that 12 > 0 at the optimal point satisfying 1 = 0, which implies strategic comple-
mentarity, and 13 > 0.
Let us solve for the optimal export subsidy under price competition and free entry. The price
of the foreign firms p and of the domestic firm pH and the number of firms n solve a system of
the equilibrium conditions
[
pH − c − s
θ
] [
(n − 1)p− θ1−θ + p−
θ
1−θ
H
]
=
[
p
1
1−θ
H − (c − s)p
− θ1−θ
H
]
(A.2)
[
p − c
θ
] [
(n − 1)p− θ1−θ + p−
θ
1−θ
H
]
=
[
p
1
1−θ − cp− θ1−θ
]
(A.3)
and the free entry condition
Y
(
p−
θ
1−θ − cp− 11−θ
)
(1 + α)
[
(n − 1)p− θ1−θ + p−
θ
1−θ
H
] = F.(A.4)
From (A.3) and (A.4) one can derive the price of the international firms as
p = cY
θ[Y − F (1 + α)] ,
which is independent of s. The optimal subsidy maximizes
W(s) = pH
− 11−θ (pH − c)[
(n − 1)p− θ1−θ + pH− θ1−θ
] − F = pH− 11−θ (pH − c)F (1 + α)(
p−
θ
1−θ − cp− 11−θ
)
Y
− F,
where we used (A.4) in the second line. It is immediate to verify that the optimal subsidy must
satisfy the first-order condition
pH = c
θ
.
Substituting for pH in the equilibrium condition (A.2), one obtains the optimal subsidy
s∗H =
c(1 − θ)
θ
{[
Y − F (1 + α)
Y
] θ
1−θ
[
Y(1 − θ)
F (1 + α) + θ
]
− 1
} > 0,(A.5)
which is increasing in F/Y , the ratio between the fixed costs of production and the size of the
market demand.
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